No inbound OT ports
The gateway phones home. The OT firewall opens nothing inbound. The PLC is never directly exposed to the internet.
Voltrus Remote connects a support engineer to an industrial PLC subnet through a self-hosted WireGuard mesh. TIA Portal, GX Works, and SoMachine talk to the PLC as if they were on the local network — no inbound firewall ports, no third-party control plane.
When a machine stops, someone has to reach the PLC fast. The usual answers are all bad. TeamViewer installs an always-on graphical backdoor on the OT network. A "quick" VPN punches an inbound hole through the firewall that nobody remembers to close. Site-to-site VPNs are a week of paperwork per site.
Every one of these exposes the PLC to the internet — exactly what every OT security standard tells you not to do.
A lightweight agent on the Linux machine at the OT edge enrols into your self-hosted WireGuard mesh and advertises only the PLC subnet behind it.
The support engineer connects with --accept-routes. A direct WireGuard path is preferred; DERP over TCP/443 is the fallback through restrictive firewalls.
Your engineering tool gets a route to the PLC subnet. S7 on TCP/102, Modbus on TCP/502 — reach the PLC at its local IP, directly.
The gateway phones home. The OT firewall opens nothing inbound. The PLC is never directly exposed to the internet.
Engineers reach only the PLC CIDRs you list — never the wider corporate LAN or the public internet through the tunnel.
We don't reimplement crypto. The agent drives the official audited WireGuard/Noise stack. The private key never leaves the device; Headscale holds the public key only.
You own the Headscale control plane. No per-user SaaS tax, no third party holding your customers' network topology.
When symmetric NAT blocks a direct path, traffic falls back to DERP over TCP/443 — the port every firewall already allows.
No screen-sharing lag, no RDP hop. The engineering tool talks to the PLC directly over the tunnel — full-speed online access.
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| PLC exposed to internet | Outbound-only agent. No inbound ports on the OT firewall. |
| Engineer reaches corp LAN | Default-deny ACL; destinations limited to advertised PLC subnets. |
| Lateral movement across sites | Each gateway advertises only its specific PLC CIDR. |
| Private key theft | WG private key never leaves the device. |
| Standing access | Roadmap: time-boxed grants (2h), default-deny between sessions. |
TeamViewer installs an always-on graphical remote-desktop backdoor on the OT network and routes your traffic through a third party. Voltrus Remote gives the engineer a network route to the PLC subnet only — no graphical access to operator PCs, no third-party control plane, no inbound ports. You run the control plane yourself.
No. The gateway makes an outbound connection to the control plane. That is the only direction. If UDP is blocked, traffic falls back to the DERP relay over outbound TCP/443 — the same port used for HTTPS, which every firewall already permits.
No. The gateway advertises only the specific PLC subnet you configure (e.g. 192.168.10.0/24), and the default-deny ACL limits the engineer to exactly that. The wider corporate LAN is never reachable through the tunnel.
Yes. The engineer gets a route to the PLC subnet, so the native engineering tool connects to the PLC at its local IP — S7 on TCP/102, Modbus on TCP/502 — exactly as if the laptop were on the LAN. No screen-sharing latency.
On the gateway device only. The Headscale control plane stores the public key, never the private key. Crypto is the audited Noise/WireGuard implementation in the official tailscale client — Voltrus Remote drives it, it does not reimplement it.
The MVP (reach-PLC) is in active development. Early-access deployments are being lined up now — reach out to join the cohort for your site.
Self-hosted WireGuard mesh. Outbound-only. Default-deny. Join the early-access cohort.
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